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Coordinating Channels for Durable Goods: The Impact of Competing
Secondary Markets
Abstract

A large literature in economics and marketing studies the problem of manufacturer’s designing contracts that
give a retailer appropriate incentives to make decisions that are optimal from the manufacturer’s point of view
(see, for example, Spengler 1950, Jeuland and Shugan 1983, McGuire and Staelin 1983, Lal 1990, Rao and
Srinivasan 1995, Desai 1997, among others). An important result from this literature is that the manufacturer
can coordinate retail price decisions by choosing a two-part tariff in which the wholesale price equals the
manufacturer’s marginal cost and the fixed fee extracts all the rents from the retailer. In other words, the
manufacturer sells the firm to the retailer for the fixed fee and, thus, eliminates the double-marginalization
problem.
Although this result is well established for non-durables, researchers have not analyzed the coordination issue
for durable goods manufacturers who have the added complexity of competition from used goods in
secondary markets. In this paper, we show how the coordination problem for a durable goods manufacturer is
fundamentally different from the traditional coordination problem of a non-durables manufacturer. In
particular, the durable goods manufacturer has to solve not only the coordination problem but also the timeconsistency problem (see, for example, Coase 1972, Bulow 1982, Purohit 1995). Our objectives in this paper
are to investigate whether or not the insights from the channel coordination literature, that has developed
principally with non-durable goods in mind, are also applicable to durable goods. In order to do this, we
develop a dynamic, two-period model in which a manufacturer sells its products to a retailer who sells the
product to consumers. Products sold in the first period become used goods in the second period and compete
with sales of new units. Starting from consumer utilities, we derive inverse demand functions for new and
used goods and consider a number of different contracts between the manufacturer and the retailer.
We start with a simple contract in which the manufacturer offers a wholesale price for a period at the
beginning of that period. As one would expect, this contract does not solve either the channel coordination
problem or the time-consistency problem. We then consider a number of two-part tariff contracts. Given the
well-established results from the existing channel coordination literature, we begin with a contract in which
the manufacturer offers per-period two-part tariffs in which all wholesale prices are set at marginal cost. We
find that not only does this contract fail to achieve channel coordination, but the retailer sells a higher quantity
than an integrated manufacturer would sell. This is in contrast to the traditional double marginalization
problem in which the retailer sells a lower quantity than an integrated manufacturer would sell.
We then allow the wholesale prices to be different from marginal costs. We show that using this more general
two-part tariff contract, the manufacturer can achieve channel coordination. That is, the total channel profit is
the same as the profit of an integrated seller. However, the equilibrium wholesale price in the first period is
strictly above the marginal cost.
Next, we consider a contract in which the manufacturer uses a single fixed fee, announced at the beginning of
the first period. The per-period wholesale prices are still at the marginal cost level in this contract. This
contract is identical to “selling the firm to the retailer” at the price of the fixed fee. Here we find that the
contract can achieve channel coordination. However, the contract is not an equilibrium solution. In particular,
the manufacturer increases wholesale prices to above marginal cost levels.
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Although some of the contracts above solve the double marginalization problem, none of them mitigates the
time consistency problem. In order to solve both these problems, the contract must yield total channel profit
equal to an integrated renter’s profit. Because the renter does not have a problem with time consistency, an
integrated renter earns the highest profits in a durable goods channel. We derive a contract that solves both of
these problems. In this contract, at the beginning of period 1, the manufacturer writes a contract with the
retailer specifying a fixed fee and two per-period wholesale prices, both of which turn out to be strictly above
the marginal cost. Interestingly, with this contract, the manufacturer makes more money by selling through
the retailer rather than selling directly to consumers.
We contribute to the coordination literature by examining coordination issues in a dynamic, durable goods
context and identifying a new coordination problem—unlike the traditional coordination models, a durable
goods manufacturer may have to provide the retailer incentives to sell less rather than to sell more. Clearly, the
traditional “selling the firm to the retailer,” approach does not solve this new problem. We also contribute to
the durable goods literature by showing how a durable goods manufacturer can sell its product and solve its
time consistency problem. Effectively, this allows the manufacturer to earn the same profits as it would get if it
could commit to prices or if it could rent its product. When committing to individual consumers or renting
can only be achieved through additional costs, our solution is the optimal strategy for a durable goods
manufacturer.
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Abstract

In this paper, we show how managing a durable goods channel is significantly diﬀerent from
managing a channel for non-durables. Although both channels have to deal with the problem
of coordination, the durable goods manufacturer also has to deal with the problem of timeconsistency. We show that the standard contracts that coordinate a channel for non-durables
do not coordinate the channels for durables.
Focusing on the marketing of durables, we explore whether the idea of “selling the firm” to
the retailer ensures channel coordination. When the manufacturer oﬀers per-period two-part
tariﬀs in which all wholesale prices are set at marginal cost, we find that not only does this
contract fail to achieve channel coordination, but the retailer sells a higher quantity than an
integrated manufacturer would sell. This is in contrast to the traditional double marginalization
problem in which the retailer sells a lower quantity than an integrated manufacturer would sell.
Using a more general two-part tariﬀ contract, we show that the manufacturer can achieve
channel coordination. However, the equilibrium wholesale price in the first period is strictly
above the marginal cost. Next, we derive a contract that solves both the channel coordination
and time consistency problems. In this contract, at the beginning of period 1, the manufacturer
writes a contract with the retailer specifying a fixed fee and two per-period wholesale prices,
both of which turn out to be strictly above the marginal cost. Interestingly, with this contract,
the manufacturer makes higher profits by selling through the retailer than selling directly to
consumers.
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1

Introduction

Most manufacturers do not have their own retail outlets and instead rely on intermediaries
to sell their products to end users. For example, auto manufacturers use independent dealers
and PC manufacturers sell through large retailers such as Best Buy or CompUSA. In dealing
with intermediaries, manufacturers have to solve the problem of coordinating the channel –
that is, ensuring that the downstream players take actions that the manufacturer would like
them to take. Although this problem is well known and has been studied extensively, the
focus has been on coordinating channels for nondurable products. However, it is not clear if
the solution to the coordination problem for nondurables should also apply to durables. In
particular, unlike nondurables, manufacturers and retailers of durables have to contend with
potential competition from a secondary market – consumers always have the option of buying
used cars instead of new ones. The basic question we address in this paper is as follows: In the
case of durable products, how should a manufacturer structure its contract with the retailer so
that it can coordinate the channel and manage the competition from the secondary market?
In the process, we show how the coordination problem in distribution channels for durable
products is significantly diﬀerent from the standard coordination problem for non-durables.
In a channel that consists of multiple decision-makers, the coordination problem arises
because, each decision-maker owns and operates a part of the channel and makes decisions that
optimize its own profit. Such selfish optimization behavior leads to uncoordinated decisions
in that they are not optimal either for the other decision-maker or for the whole distribution
channel. For example, the retailer may choose a price that maximizes its own profit, but
generally that uncoordinated price is not the best price from the manufacturer’s or from the
channel’s point of view. A large literature in economics and marketing studies a manufacturer’s
problem of designing contracts that give the retailer appropriate incentives to make decisions
that align, or coordinate, the retailer’s and manufacturer’s goals (see, for example, Spengler
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1950, Jeuland and Shugan 1983, McGuire and Staelin 1983, Lal 1990, Rao and Srinivasan
1995, Desai 1997, among others). For example, a manufacturer can coordinate the channel by
choosing a two-part tariﬀ in which the wholesale price is set at the manufacturer’s marginal
cost and the fixed fee extracts all the profits over the minimum amount needed to retain the
participation of the retailer. Said diﬀerently, the manufacturer can solve the coordination
problem by selling the firm to the retailer at a price equal to the fixed fee. This can also
be thought of as making the retailer the residual claimant to the channel profits. When the
retailer is the residual claimant, then it has the appropriate incentives to choose a price (or
other decision variable) that maximizes the channel’s profits.
Although this result is well established for non-durables, researchers have not analyzed the
coordination issue for durable goods that have the added complexity of competition from used
goods in secondary markets. In particular, the durable goods manufacturer has to solve not only
the channel coordination problem but also the time-consistency problem. We develop a dynamic
model to analyze the eﬀect of several diﬀerent types of contracts in solving the coordination
and time consistency problems. In particular, we investigate whether the strategy of selling
the firm to the retailer can solve either the coordination or the time-consistency problem.
Importantly, we derive a relatively simple contract that solves both these problems, and find
that an integrated manufacturer can increase its profits if it markets its product through a
retailer.
The coordination problem for a durable goods manufacturer is significantly diﬀerent from
the traditional coordination problem of a non-durables manufacturer, principally because of the
competition between used and new goods. In particular, suppose a firm sells a certain quantity
of a durable to consumers. Having sold this initial quantity, the firm still faces a residual
demand for the good, consisting of those consumers who place a value on the good lower than
the current market price. As a result, the firm has an incentive to lower its price to attract
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this set of consumers. It is easy to see how this process of skimming the market could continue
until the firm lowers price to its marginal cost of production. However, from a consumer’s
perspective, each time the firm lowers price, it also lowers the “value” of the product that the
consumer had purchased at a higher price in an earlier period. Thus, rational consumers would
factor in future price reductions into their current willingness to pay. Coase (1972) conjectured
that if the firm were to exploit residual demand in future periods, then rational consumers would
anticipate this behavior and price would fall to the competitive level in the “twinkling of an
eye.” Thus, the net eﬀect of product durability and rationality on the part of consumers is that
the firm’s profits are reduced. Further research in this area has formalized Coase’s conjecture
(e.g., Bulow 1982; Stokey 1981) and pointed out conditions under which it does not hold, e.g.,
if there is a constant inflow of new customers (Conlisk, Gerstner and Sobel 1984), if the good
depreciates (Bond and Samuelson 1984), or if the firm has increasing marginal production costs
(Kahn 1986).
The central problem with durables arises because once a manufacturer sells a unit it is no
longer interested in what happens to the value of that unit. Thus, by lowering prices for new
products over time, the firm also lowers the value of old units owned by consumers. However,
as argued previously, rational consumers would anticipate this behavior and force the firm to
lower prices immediately. As a result, the only way for the firm to maintain a higher price level
is if it can convince consumers that it will not lower prices over time. Even though ex ante
(at the time of initial sales), the firm prefers to make such a promise, ex post (after consumers
have bought the product), it would prefer to break the promise. Thus, the firm’s preferences
are not time consistent and consumers would not believe any promises made by the firm. A
promise would be credible only if it were a legally binding commitment, for example, through
a contract with individual consumers.1 However, such a strategy may be undesirable because
1

Alternatively, the manufacturer could break the molds, thus ensuring that no additional products can be
produced.
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of the impracticality of writing contracts with possibly a large number of consumers. Another
possible solution is for the firm to rent, rather than sell the product to consumers. When the
firm rents the product, it retains the ownership of used units, and therefore, has an incentive
to keep the price of used units high.

However, renting is not entirely free from problems

such as the possibility of consumers potentially abusing the product and the additional costs
of marketing the product for subsequent rentals. In addition, renting may also have the added
cost of writing legal contracts with individual consumers.
When we add a distribution channel to durables, the problem becomes further exacerbated.
Now, not only does the manufacturer have to contend with issues related to time-consistency,
but it also has to write a contract that helps it solve the problem of channel coordination.
And the channel coordination problem itself is more complex because of the inter-temporal
linkages we discussed earlier. Specifically, first-period decisions aﬀect second-period outcomes,
and this eﬀect may be diﬀerent for the retailer than for an integrated seller. As a consequence,
the channel coordination for durable goods presents challenges not faced by non-durable goods
manufacturers. While some of these issues have been explored in Purohit (1995), the general
problem of coordinating a durable goods distribution channel has not been addressed. This
paper analyzes diﬀerent contracts and evaluates their ability to solve the coordination and
time-consistency problems. We develop a dynamic, two-period model in which a manufacturer
sells its products to a retailer who sells the product to consumers. Products sold in the first
period become used goods in the second period and compete with sales of new units. Starting
from consumer utilities, we build inverse demand functions for new and used goods and consider
a number of diﬀerent contracts between the manufacturer and the retailer. Some of our key
findings are as follows.

• Given the well-established results from the existing channel coordination literature, we
begin with a contract in which the manufacturer oﬀers per-period two-part tariﬀs in
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which all wholesale prices are set at the marginal cost. We find that not only does
this contract fail to achieve channel coordination, but the retailer sells a higher quantity
than an integrated manufacturer would sell. This is in contrast to the traditional double
marginalization problem in which the retailer sells a lower quantity than an integrated
manufacturer would sell.
• In contrast to the findings in the non-durable goods literature, we find that the strategy
of selling the firm to the retailer is not an equilibrium outcome.
• We find that a particular two-part tariﬀ can coordinate the supply chain. However, this
contract involves the manufacturer charging a wholesale price strictly greater than its
marginal cost in the first-period, and charging a wholesale price equal to its marginal
cost in the second period.

Although, this contract solves the coordination problem, it

does not solve the time-consistency problem – the total distribution channel profits with
this contract are the same as an integrated manufacturer’s profit when it sells directly to
consumers.
• We show that by pre-committing to a two-part contract that covers both periods, the
manufacturer can do better by going through a retailer than selling the product directly
to consumers. When the manufacturer employs this contract, the total channel profits
are identical to the channel profits when the manufacturer rents its products directly
to consumers.

These are the highest level of profits that a durable goods distribution

channel can achieve – either by renting or by selling.

Said diﬀerently, this contract

solves not only the coordination problem, but also the time-consistency problem.

We contribute to the coordination literature by showing that the inter-temporal linkage in
the durable good’s market changes the channel coordination problem. In addition to the double
marginalization problem, the manufacturer also faces the problem of inducing the retailer to
appropriately consider the competition between used and new goods. The traditional “selling
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the firm to the retailer,” or “residual claimancy,” approach does not help the durable goods
manufacturer. We also contribute to the durable goods literature by showing how a durable
goods manufacturer can sell its product and solve its time consistency problem. Eﬀectively,
this allows the manufacturer to earn the same profits as it would get if it could commit to
prices or if it could rent its product. When committing to individual consumers or renting have
additional costs, our solution may be the optimal strategy for a durable goods manufacturer.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we lay out the basic model.
Section 3 analyzes the problem of coordinating the durables goods distribution channel, and
section 4 explores the role of linear and non-linear contracts. We conclude the paper in section
5.

2

Model

In this section, we lay out our assumptions about the product and the players in our analysis
– the manufacturer, the retailer and the consumers. We assume a manufacturer produces a
durable product at a constant marginal cost of production, c > 0. We assume that the retailer’s
marginal costs are constant, and set them to zero without further loss of generality. In order to
market this product to consumers, the manufacturer uses a retailer who purchases units from
the manufacturer and sells them to consumers.
The product that is marketed is a durable that provides two periods of service. While the
exact length of product life is not crucial, it is important to allow each unit of the product
to last for more than one period.2 In our analysis, a unit sold in period 1 provides service in
periods 1 and 2. In addition, we assume that once the product is sold, then all units of the
2

Assuming the product lasts for two periods is equivalent to assuming that it becomes obsolete after n periods.
It is only important to assume that the product last for a finite amount of time (Bulow 1982).
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product deteriorate at an exogenous rate. In particular, once a consumer purchases a new unit
in period 1, the product deteriorates with usage and becomes a used good in period 2. The
extent of deterioration depends on the inherent durability, δ (0 · δ · 1) of the product. That
is, δ represents how well a unit sold in period 1 holds up in period 2, and (1 − δ) represents the
extent of deterioration due to usage. If δ = 1, the product does not deteriorate and new units
are identical to used units. If δ = 0, then the product has no durability and it deteriorates fully
after one period of use.
An important assumption of our model is that consumers who purchase the product in
period 1 always have the option of selling their used product in a secondary or used market
in period 2. For example, there are active secondary markets for a variety of products such
as automobiles, airplanes, white goods, etc. We assume that the used market is competitive
and neither the manufacturer nor the retailer have any direct control over this market. As a
consequence, used goods compete against new goods and the extent of competition between
new and used units is directly related to the durability δ. If the product is perfectly durable
(δ = 1), then new and used units are identical and new goods face the strongest competition
from used goods. On the other hand, if the product is a non-durable (i.e., δ = 0), used goods
have no value and there is no secondary market for the product.
Unlike the case of a non-durable that is consumed in an instant, a durable product is
“consumed” over time. In our model, because the product is assumed to provide services for
two periods, then a consumer who purchases a product in period 1 gets two periods of use out
of the product. We derive per-period prices for the product based on consumers’ valuations for
the services provided by the product in a given period. Therefore, consumers who purchase the
product in period 1 pay a total price that is the discounted sum of two per-period prices.
Define rij as the one-period price in period i of product j, where i = 1, 2 and j, can either
be new (n) or used (u). Similarly, define qij as the quantity sold in period i of product j. A
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product that is sold by the manufacturer (or retailer) to consumers in period one becomes a
used product in period two, i.e., q2u = q1n . To capture the one period prices of new and used
goods, we use the following inverse demand system:
r1n = α − q1n ,

(1)

r2n = α − δq2u − q2n ,

(2)

r2u = δ(α − q2n − q2u ),

(3)

where α is a positive constant that captures the size of the potential market. We show in the
Appendix that the above demand functions are derived from a well-specified consumer utility
function. Because there are no used products available in period 1, we do not have an r1u .
Note that as δ increases, used goods deteriorate less and are closer substitutes for new goods;
thus r2u increases and r2n decreases with δ. Similarly, the quantity of used cars (q2u ) negatively
aﬀects the new car price in period 2, r2n .
Equations (1—3) represent the per-period prices for the services delivered in the that period.
Because new products deliver a higher quality of service, their price is also higher, r2n ≥ r2u .
Consumers who purchase the product in period 1 are getting two periods of service from the
product – first as a new good and then as a used good. In terms of market prices, this means
that the selling price of the new product in period 1, p1n , should reflect all future service that
the product will provide. Therefore,
p1 = r1n + ρr2u

(4)

where 0 < ρ < 1 is a discount factor common to consumers and the firm.
The manufacturer in our model is assumed to play the role of a Stackelberg leader who
announces a contract to the retailer. Based on this contract, the retailer chooses the number of
units to order and sell on the market. We require that any contract that the manufacturer oﬀers
to the retailer must provide a non-negative profit to the retailer over the two-period horizon.
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To rule out uninteresting cases, we also restrict our attention to those parameter values for
which the demand in each period is strictly positive.

3

Integrated Channels

In this section we begin with an analysis of two benchmark cases – one in which the manufacturer sells directly to consumers and the other in which the manufacturer rents directly to
consumers. Although both of these results are well established (e.g., Bulow 1982), we briefly
review them in this section because they provide useful benchmarks for our subsequent model
in which we add a retailer in the distribution channel.

3.1

Integrated Seller

We first consider the case of an integrated manufacturer that sells directly to consumers. In this
case, the manufacturer chooses a sales quantity at the beginning of each period. To derive the
subgame perfect equilibrium, we solve the model recursively. In period two, the manufacturer’s
problem is to maximize profits, π2 , by choosing an optimal q2n . That is, the manufacturer
maximizes Π2 = (r2n − c)q2n . This maximization problem yields:
s∗
=
q2n

α − c − δq1n
.
2

(5)

From Equation (5), note that for any positive level of δ, as the firm sells more units in
period 1, it increases the competition from the used market in period 2. Similarly, for any
positive level of q1n , any increase in δ increases the competition from the used market. This
occurs because an increase in δ makes a used product a stronger substitute for the new one.
This creates an incentive for the firm to reduce its sales quantity in period 2. It is easy to see
that for non-durable goods that are purchased repeatedly by consumers in each period, δ = 0
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and first-period sales have no eﬀect on second-period decisions.
s∗ , in period 2, the manufacturer maximizes its total discounted profits
Given the optimal q2n
s∗ . That is, it maximizes,
in the first period by choosing the optimal first period quantity, q1n
3
Π1 = (p1n − c)q1n + ρΠs∗
2 by choosing the optimal q1n . This yields
s∗
=
q1n

3.2

2[(α − c(1 − δρ)]
1
2δ[α − c(1 − δρ)]
s∗
= [α − c −
and q2n
].
4 + δρ(4 − 3δ)
2
4 + δρ(4 − 3δ)

(6)

Integrated Renter

The integrated renter rents the product to consumers in each period. In period 1, because there
are no “used” units, the firm rents only new ones. However, in period 2, the firm rents both
new as well as used units carried over from period 1. The integrated renter’s profit in period 2
is given by Π2 = r2u q1n + (r2n − c)q2n . The firm maximizes its total profits over the two period
horizon,
Π1 = (r1n − c)q1n + ρΠ2 ,

(7)

by choosing optimal quantities for both periods. This yields:
r∗
=
q1n
r∗
=
q2n

α − c(1 − δρ)
,
2 + 2δρ(1 − δ)
µ
¶
1
αδ + c[1 − δ(1 − ρ)]
α−
.
2
1 + δρ(1 − δ)

(8)

Because a renter of a durable good does not have a problem with time consistency, it
is well known that an integrated renter is more profitable than an integrated seller (Bulow
1982). In particular, the profits of an integrated renter represent the highest possible profits
in the distribution channel. On the other hand, if an integrated seller could credibly commit
to the quantities it would market, then it could replicate the results of an integrated renter.
3

Recall that p1n = r1n + ρr2u
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It is important to emphasize that this result hinges on the manufacturer’s ability to credibly
commit to these quantities. In other words, if consumers do not believe the manufacturer, then
the results in Equations (8) are not feasible, because consumers anticipate the firm will renege
on its commitment in period 2. In this event, the firm’s optimal strategy is given by Equation
(6).

4

Decentralized Channels

Now we consider the case of a manufacturer that has to rely on the services of a retailer.
The retailer purchases the product from the manufacturer and sells it to consumers. Below,
we examine various contracts that the manufacturer can oﬀer to the retailer, beginning with
simple wholesale prices and then moving to two-part tariﬀs.

4.1

Wholesale Price Contract

First, we consider the case where the manufacturer charges a simple wholesale price in each
period. Based upon the wholesale price announced at the beginning of each period, the retailer
chooses the optimal quantity to order and sell on the market. In order to achieve the subgame
perfect equilibrium, we solve the game recursively, beginning with the decisions in period 2.
In period 2, the retailer maximizes profits, πD2 = (r2n − w2 )q2n , by choosing an optimal
q2n , where w2 is the wholesale price in period 2. This yields:
∗
=
q2n

α − w2 − δq1n
.
2

(9)

Given the retailer’s optimal choice, the manufacturer maximizes its period 2 profits, πM2 =
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∗ , by choosing an optimal w . This yields:
(w2 − c)q2n
2

w2∗ =

(α + c − δq1n )
.
2

(10)

In period one, the retailer maximizes its discounted profits,
πD1 = (r1n + ρr2u − w1 )q1n + ρπD2 ,

(11)

by choosing an optimal q1n . This yields:
∗
=
q1n

α(8 + 5δρ) − 8w1 + 3cδρ
.
16 + δρ (16 − 5δ)

Given the retailer’s optimal decisions, the manufacturer maximizes its discounted profits,
∗
+ ρπM2 ,
πM1 = (w1 − c)q1n

(12)

by choosing its optimal w1 . This yields:
w1∗

£
¤
α[128 + 240δρ − 45δ 3 ρ2 − 56δ 2 ρ (1 − 2ρ)] + c 128 + 144δρ − 11δ 3 ρ2 − 8δ 2 ρ (5 − 2ρ)
=
.
32 (8 + 8δρ − 3δ 2 ρ)

(13)

It is straightforward to show that, as one would expect, a simple wholesale price contract
does not solve the coordination problem for either durables or non-durables. In the following
section, we attempt to solve the coordination problem in a durable goods channel by studying
a variety of two-part tariﬀs.

4.2

Two-Part Tariﬀs

Now we consider the case of a distribution channel in which the manufacturer charges a twopart tariﬀ consisting of a fixed and a variable fee. The fixed fee is a lump-sum payment and
the variable fee is a constant wholesale price per unit ordered. The standard result from the
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non-durables literature is that a two-part tariﬀ coordinates the channel. In this coordinating
contract, the manufacturer sets the wholesale price at marginal cost and extracts all the retailer
profit through the fixed fee. This ensures that the retailer faces the same variable cost structure
as an integrated manufacturer. In this strategy, the manufacturer essentially “sells” the firm to
the retailer at a fixed fee and the retailer acts as the integrated manufacturer. In this section, we
explore whether such an approach can solve the problem of managing a durable goods channel.
In particular, we look at a series of two-part tariﬀs that explore whether coordination can occur
through selling the firm to the retailer. We begin with a contract in which the manufacturer
oﬀers per-period two-part tariﬀs in which all wholesale prices are set at the manufacturer’s
marginal cost. Subsequently, we allow wholesale prices to be diﬀerent from marginal cost.
Finally, we explore contracts in which the manufacturer commits to prices ahead of time.

4.2.1

Two-Part Tariﬀ with w1 =w2 =c

It is well known that a two-part tariﬀ in which the manufacturer sets the wholesale price at its
marginal cost and extracts all the rents from the retailer through a fixed fee coordinates the
channel for a nondurable. In this section we test whether or not such a contract can achieve
the same goal in a distribution channel for a durable product.
We begin by assuming that the wholesale prices are given by w1 = c and w2 = c, and the
retailer maximizes its period 2 profits,
πD2 = (r2n − c)q2n − F2 .
◦ :
This leads to the optimal production quantity, q2n
◦
=
q2n

α − c − δq1n
.
2

The manufacturer does not gain from leaving any positive profit for the retailer in period
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2. Therefore, it chooses F2 to extract all the profit from the retailer.4
The problem in period 1 is solved in a similar manner and is not detailed here. When
wholesale prices are constrained to equal marginal cost, the optimal fixed fees are given by:
F1◦ =
F2◦ =

[2(α − c) + (α + c)δρ]2
16 + 8δρ(2 − δ)
"
#2
δ[α − c + 12 (α + c)δρ]
1
.
α−c−
4
2 + δρ(2 − δ)

(14)

This leads to the following proposition:5

Proposition 1 A per-period two-part tariﬀ with wholesale prices set at marginal cost does not
coordinate the durable goods channel.

At first blush, it may seem that charging a two-part tariﬀ in each period should coordinate
the channel. However, in the case of durables, this turns out not to be the case. Note that the
manufacturer always has an incentive to choose a second-period fixed fee that extracts all the
second-period rents from the retailer. However, the retailer in period 1 anticipates this move
by the manufacturer in period 2. Therefore, in making the first-period quantity decision, the
retailer does not consider any eﬀect of its decision on the outcomes in period 2. As a result,
the retailer ends up choosing a first-period quantity that is too high from the manufacturer’s
and channel’s perspectives. In other words, the optimal two-part tariﬀ leaves the retailer with
no stakes in the period 2 outcome, and recognizing this, the retailer acts as a single-period
optimizer in period 1.

This is the reason for the sub-optimality of the two-part tariﬀ with

marginal cost pricing.
4

We only require that the retailer earns a non-negative profit over the model horizon. Therefore, it is possible
that the manufacturer can leave a negative profit for the retailer in period 2 and a positive profit for the retailer
in period 1 such that the net present value of the two profits is non-negative. It turns out that such a solution
leads to the same outcome as the solution described in here. More details are available from the authors.
5
All proofs are in the Appendix.
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An interesting aspect of this solution is that even while restricting the wholesale prices to
marginal cost, “selling the firm” does not emerge as a solution. Under the current form of
contract, selling the firm emerges as a solution only if the optimal second-period fixed fee were
zero. This, however, is not an equilibrium because we find that the second-period fixed fee is
always positive.
An interesting corollary to the above proposition is that the retailer’s period 1 selling quantity is in fact higher than that of an integrated manufacturer.

In traditional channel coor-

dination settings, because of the double marginalization problem, the retailer sells too low a
quantity; hence the optimal two-part tariﬀ coordinates the system by increasing the quantities
to the optimal amount. What we discover in our setting is that a two-part tariﬀ with marginal
cost pricing leads the retailer to sell too much! Proposition 1 highlights why the channel coordination problem is diﬀerent in the durable goods markets. In addition, this suggests that
there are two possible approaches for the manufacturer to reach an equilibrium solution. The
first solution is to charge a wholesale price above the marginal cost – a higher wholesale price
can potentially bring down quantities to the appropriate level. The other possible solution is
not to extract all the profits from the retailer in period 2, so that the retailer has some stakes
in period 2 outcome. We consider both these possibilities next.

4.2.2

General Two-Part Tariﬀ Contract

Now we consider the optimal two-part tariﬀ without imposing any restrictions on the variable
fee. As in the previous cases considered, we solve this model recursively, beginning with the
retailer’s problem in period 2. The retailer maximizes period 2 profits,
πD2 = (r2n − w2 )q2n − F2 ,
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by choosing the optimal q2n , subject to πD2 ≥ 0. This yields:
∗∗
=
q2n

α − w2 − δq1n
.
2

Based upon this choice, the manufacturer maximizes its profits in period 2,
πM2 = (w2 − c)q2n + F2 ,
by choosing the optimal w2 and F2 . This yields: w2∗∗ = c and, as before, the manufacturer
∗∗ = 0. The problem in period 1
chooses F2 such that the retailer earns no rents in period 2, πD2

is solved in a similar manner and is not detailed here. The period 1 wholesale price and fixed
fee are given by:
w1∗∗

=

F1∗∗ =

£
¤
£
¤
αδρ 4 − 3δ 2 ρ − 2δ (1 − 2ρ) + c 8 + 4δρ + δ 3 ρ2 − 4δ 2 ρ (1 + ρ)
,
8 + 2δρ(4 − 3δ)
¢
¡
2 [α − c (1 − δρ)]2 2 + 2δρ − δ 2 ρ
.
(4 + 4δρ − 3δ 2 ρ)2

(15)
(16)

Note that for any δ > 0, the optimal wholesale price in period 1 is greater than marginal
cost, w1∗∗ > c. When δ = 0, then the product we are considering is a non-durable, and we get
the standard result of marginal cost pricing, w1∗∗ = c.
The retailer’s optimal quantities are given by:
∗∗
=
q1n
∗∗
=
q2n

2[α − c (1 − δρ)]
,
4 + 4δρ − 3δ 2 ρ
£
¤
α 4 − 3δ2 ρ − 2δ (1 − 2ρ) − c[4 − 2δ(1 − 2ρ) − δ 2 ρ]
.
2(4 + 4δρ − 3δ 2 ρ)

(17)
(18)

Comparing the quantities in Equations (17-18) with the quantities in Equation (6), it is
clear that the above contract induces the retailer to choose coordinated quantities.

Proposition 2 There exists a two part tariﬀ that coordinates the distribution channel. In this
contract:
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• The manufacturer charges w1∗∗ ≥ c in the first period and w2∗∗ = c in the second period.
• The manufacturer’s profits are equal to those of an integrated manufacturer selling directly
to consumers.

Thus, similar to the case of non-durables, there exists a two-part tariﬀ that can coordinate
the distribution channel for a durable product. However, there is an important diﬀerence – the
manufacturer sells at marginal cost only in period 2; in period 1, it sells strictly above marginal
cost. The rationale for setting wholesale price above marginal cost in period 1 can be understood
from our discussion in the previous section. In particular, note that when the manufacturer sets
the first-period wholesale price at marginal cost, the retailer’s optimal sales quantity in period 1
is higher than the coordinated quantity. Therefore, the manufacturer raises its wholesale price
above its marginal cost, eﬀectively increasing the retailer’s per-unit costs and, in turn, inducing
it to choose a lower sales quantity.

Although this two-part tariﬀ eﬀectively coordinates the

distribution channel to the level of an integrated seller, the distribution channel as a whole
still suﬀers from the same time-consistency problem that an integrated seller of a durable good
would face.

4.2.3

Fixed Fee Commitment

Proposition 1 shows that when the manufacturer extracts all the retailer’s profits in period 2,
the retailer has no stake in the outcome of period 2. As a result, it ignores the inter-temporal
linkages, and sells more than what the manufacturer would want it to. Earlier we showed how
selling above marginal cost is a solution to this problem. Below we consider another possible
solution – by not extracting all the profits from the retailer in period 2, the manufacturer
gives the retailer a stake in the outcome in period 2. If the manufacturer has to choose the
period 2 fixed fee, F2 , at the end of period 1, then its incentives are to choose F2 to extract
all the period 2 profit from the retailer. Therefore, in period 1 the retailer will anticipate this
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behavior of the manufacturer, and we will revert back to the result in Proposition 1. The only
way the manufacturer can convince the retailer that it will not extract all the retailer profits in
period 2 is to commit to a specific value of F2 at the beginning of period 1, before the retailer
chooses the first-period quantity. In other words, the manufacturer needs to oﬀer a contract
that specifies fixed fees for both periods at the beginning of period 1. It is easy to see that this
approach is equivalent to charging a single fixed fee. Note that we see similar arrangements in
practice in which retailers pay a one-time fixed (lump sum) fee to obtain the rights to sell a
manufacturer’s products and then pay per-unit wholesale fees for the products that they buy.
Our specific interest in analyzing this type of contract is to see if the equilibrium wholesale
prices are equal to the marginal cost. The reason is that if the equilibrium solution involves
the manufacturer setting the wholesale prices at marginal cost, then this solution is equivalent
to one where the manufacturer simply sells the firm to the retailer at a price equal to the fixed
fee. This leads to the following:

Proposition 3 When the manufacturer commits to a fixed fee, it charges wholesale prices above
marginal cost in both periods.

Proposition 3 shows that even when the manufacturer can commit to fixed prices, selling
the firm is not an equilibrium outcome. The manufacturer who sells through a retailer charges
wholesale prices above marginal cost in both periods. The reason is that once the manufacturer
sets the fixed fee at the beginning of period, it gains from charging a wholesale price above the
marginal cost in period 2. As a result, the period 1 wholesale price is also above marginal cost.
However, this suggests that if the manufacturer can commit to both – the wholesale prices
and fixed fees – for both periods at the beginning of period 1, then it can better alleviate the
channel coordination problem. We discuss such a contract next.

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2001

19

Review of Marketing Science Working Papers, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 2

4.2.4

A Commitment Contract

In this case, we consider the case of a manufacturer who can write a contract in period 1 that
covers both periods. In particular, the manufacturer announces a fixed fee, F , and wholesale
prices, w1 and w2 , at the beginning of period 1. Note that charging one fixed fee for both
periods versus charging two diﬀerent fixed fees – one for each period – does not make any
diﬀerence in the current contract. It is straightforward to see that the single fixed fee in the
current contract can be broken up into two fixed fees without changing the outcome.
The game is solved recursively by first solving the retailer’s problem in period 2, followed
by its problem in period 1. The retailer’s problem is solved recursively because the retailer is
not able to credibly commit to future prices to the market as a whole. On the other hand, the
manufacturer can make a credible price commitment to a single retailer. Given the retailer’s
optimal choices, the manufacturer maximizes its total profits by choosing the optimal contract
– the fixed fee and both wholesale prices.
The retailer’s optimal quantities are:
∗∗∗∗
=
q1n
∗∗∗∗
q2n
=

α − c (1 − δρ)]
,
2 + 2δρ − 2δ 2 ρ
α (1 − δ) (1 + δρ) − c[1 − δ (1 − ρ)]
.
2 + 2δρ − 2δ 2 ρ

(19)
(20)

Comparing Equations (19-20) with Equation (8), it is clear that the current contract results
in the same quantities that an integrated renter would choose and results in the highest profits
for the distribution channel.
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The optimal wholesale prices and fixed fee are as follows
¡
¢
αδ 2 ρ + c 4 + 4δρ + δ3 ρ2 − 5δ 2 ρ
∗∗∗∗
w1
=
,
4 + 4δρ − 4δ 2 ρ
αδ + c (2 − δ) (1 + δρ)
w2∗∗∗∗ =
,
2 + 2δρ − 2δ 2 ρ
2Acα + Bc2 + Dα2
,
F ∗∗∗∗ =
8[1 + δρ (1 − δ)]2
where A, B, D are as given in the Appendix.
It is easy to see that w1∗∗∗∗ ≥ c and w2∗∗∗∗ ≥ c with the equalities holding only for δ = 0 (the
product is non-durable). Thus, when δ = 0, our results reduce to the traditional marginal cost
pricing results for non-durable manufacturers.

Proposition 4 In a distribution channel that consists of a durable product manufacturer who
sells to a retailer who sells to consumers, a two-part tariﬀ with commitment coordinates the
distribution channel and achieves the highest level of profits. The optimal wholesale price in
this contract is above marginal cost in each period.

By committing not only to a specific fixed fee but also to specific wholesale prices, the
manufacturer induces the selling retailer to choose the same quantities as an integrated renter.
In the absence of the retailer, an integrated seller would not be able to choose these quantities
without making credible commitments to individual consumers. It is often the case that a
commitment to a retailer is less costly, more credible and ultimately more enforceable than
commitments to numerous individual consumers. In such cases, having a retailer helps the
manufacturer solve the time consistency problem and allows it to earn greater profits than it
would if it were an integrated seller.
Interestingly, in non-durable goods settings, the best that a decentralized manufacturer can
do is obtain the profits of an integrated manufacturer. On the other hand, a durable goods
seller can do even better by selling through a retailer – it can earn the same profits as an
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integrated renter. If renting the same unit multiple times involves additional marketing costs,
then it may be the case that selling through a retailer may even dominate renting directly to
consumers.
Finally, we note that in this type of contract also, selling the firm to the retailer is a feasible
solution. However, it doesn’t turn out to be the equilibrium outcome.

5

Conclusions

This paper introduces the problem of managing a channel for a durable good. This is a complex
problem because not only does the manufacturer have to deal with the problem of coordination
but also the problem of time-consistency. The problem of coordination arises because of the
need to align the manufacturer’s and retailer’s goals. On the other hand, the time-consistency
problem arises because of consumers beliefs that future market prices of the durable will fall.
For a manufacturer that can only sell its product to consumers, the only way out of this
problem is to make a commitment not to lower prices in the future. While a commitment
such as this is certainly possible – and it may even be honored by a firm that cares about
its reputation – the fact remains that, ex post it is not time-consistent and the manufacturer
has an incentive to deviate from its ex ante commitment. In addition, it is diﬃcult, although
not impossible, for a firm to make numerous commitments to individual consumers in the
market. Similarly, although renting the product eliminates the problem of time-consistency, it
suﬀers from other problems such as consumer moral hazard and the need to market the product
multiple times in its lifetime. In this paper, we oﬀer a simpler way out of this problem: Make
a price commitment with a two-part tariﬀ to a retailer. The beauty of this contract is that
it solves not only the coordination problem but also the retailer’s time-consistency problem.
More importantly, the price commitment is also credible, because it is made through a contract
between a manufacturer and a retailer. Business-to-business contracts such as this are readily
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verifiable and enforceable. Thus, our analysis shows that selling can be as profitable as renting.
And if we consider additional costs of renting or leasing, selling can be more profitable. This
also oﬀers another explanation for why leasing is not as widespread as theoretical predictions
would suggest.
We also derive interesting insights about the channel coordination problem for a durable
goods manufacturer. We show that under certain conditions, a retailer may sell more than
an integrated manufacturer. To induce the retailer to sell fewer quantities of the durable, the
wholesale price exceeds the manufacturer’s marginal cost. We also show that a manufacturer
can gain by committing to future terms of trade with the retailer. The reason is that the channel
coordination problem is worsened by the manufacturer’s incentives to act opportunistically in
the future. Once the retailer makes his first-period decisions, the manufacturer has incentives
to extract all the profits from the retailer in period two. By making a contractual commitment
not to act in such a way, the manufacturer makes the channel coordination task easier.
The results in this paper are important in establishing how firms can coordinate the channels for durable products. We find that the specifics of the contract vary with the inherent
durability of the product and the extent of competition posed by the secondary market. Our
analysis has implications for any durable product category in which manufacturers sell through
intermediaries. By incorporating the strategic impact of consumer strategies in a multi-period
durable-goods setting, we are able to add insights to the channels literature. In particular,
we argue that product durability plays a crucial role in manufacturer relationships with retailers. We acknowledge that we have treated durability as an exogenous variable and assumed
that there is no uncertainty about demand. Clearly manufacturers have some control over the
durability that they build into a product and they often face uncertain demand. We intend to
explore both these avenues in future research.
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Appendix

Derivation of Demand Functions
We model consumers who are heterogeneous in their valuations of the durable good. In this
vertical diﬀerentiation model, we use the parameter φ ∈ (0, α) to represent a consumer’s valuation of the per-period service provided by a new product. Note that a consumer with a
higher φ values the product more than a consumer with a lower φ. Finally, we assume that φ
is distributed uniformly in the interval [0, 1] and, in any period, each consumer uses at most
one product. Recall from our discussion earlier that the product deteriorates as it ages. Thus,
a consumer’s valuation of the per-period services from a used product are δφ.
The net utility from using a product for a single period is:
U = δmφ − r

(A1)

where m is an indicator variable such that m = 0 if the product is new and m = 1 if the product
is used, and r is the one-period price.
In equilibrium, consumers choose one of the following four strategies: (i) buy a new product
in period 1 and, in period 2, sell their used product and buy a new product (BB); (ii) buy a new
product in the first period and hold onto it in the second period (BH); (iii) remain inactive in
period 1 and buy a used product in period 2 (IU); and (iv) be inactive in both periods (II). In
terms of consumer utility, it can be shown that if all four strategies are observed in equilibrium,
then consumers who follow a BB strategy value the product more (i.e., have a higher φ) than
consumers who follow a BH strategy, who value it more than consumers who follow an IU
strategy, who value it more than consumers who follow an II strategy.
First consider the consumers in period 2. Following the notation in the text, let q1n (= q2u )
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and q2n be the number of products sold in period 1 and 2, respectively. Consider the lowest
valuation consumer who adopts an IU strategy. This consumer is located at a point φ3 =
α−q1n −q2n on the [0, α] line and has to be indiﬀerent between following an IU and an II strategy.
From Equation (A1), this consumer’s net utility from an IU strategy is δ(α − q1n − q2n ) − r2u ,
and the utility from following an II strategy is zero. Equating these two utilities, we get the
following demand for used products:
r2u = δ(α − q2u − q2n ).

(A2)

Now consider the lowest valuation consumer who adopts a BB strategy. This consumer is
located at a point φ1 = α − q2n and has to be indiﬀerent between BB and BH strategies. In
period 2, the net utility from a BB strategy is α − q2n − r2n + r2u .6 Similarly, the net utility
from holding onto the product in period 2 is δ(α − q2n ). Equating these two utilities yields the
one-period price for new products in period 2:
r2n = α − q2n − δq2u .

(A3)

Now consider the consumers in period 1 and assume that they are making a decision about
using the services of the product for a single period. The last consumer who uses a product in
period 1 is located at a point α − q1n . This consumer has to be indiﬀerent between using this
product for one period and staying out of the market in this period. Equating the utilities from
these two strategies yields the one-period price in period 1:
r1n = α − q1n .

(A4)

Now consider the two-period horizon when consumers are buying the product in period 1.
At this stage, the marginal consumer (located at α−q1n ) should be indiﬀerent between following
6

Recall that a BB strategy means that the consumer buys a new product in period 1, sells it at a price r2u
in period 2 and buys another new product at a price of r2n .
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a BH strategy and an IU strategy. That is, this consumer can either buy a product now and
continue using the same product in period 2, or buy nothing now and wait until period 2 to
buy a used product. Equating the net utilities of the BH and IU strategies of this consumer
implies that
α − q1n − p1n + ρ[δ(α − q1n )] = ρ[δ(α − q1n ) − r2u ].
This yields the selling price of the product in period 1:
p1n = r1n + ρr2u .

(A5)

Proofs of Propositions
Proposition 1
An integrated seller’s profit, Πs , is given by:

Πs =

4(α − c)2 + 4ρ(α − c)(α + c(−1 + 2δ)) + δρ2 (4(α − c)2 + δ(c2 + 6cα − 3α2 ))
.
16 + 4δρ(4 − 3δ)

(A6)

A decentralized seller’s profit when charging a two-part tariﬀ with w1 = w2 = c, Π◦ , is given
by
(2α − 2c − ρδ(c + α))2 ρ
+
Π =
16 + 8δρ(2 − δ)
4
◦

Ã

δ(α − c + 12 (α + c)δρ)
α−c−
−2 + δρ(−2 + δ)

!2

.

(A7)

In addition, the diﬀerence
Πs − Π◦ =

δ 2 ρ2 [c(−4 + δ(2 − 4ρ) + δ 2 ρ) + α(4 − 3δ 2 ρ + δ(−2 + 4ρ))]2
> 0.
16(2 + 2δρ − δ 2 ρ)2 (4 + 4δρ − 3δ 2 ρ)
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Proposition 2
From Equations (6), (17) and (18), it is clear that the {w1∗∗ , w2∗∗ , F1∗∗ , F2∗∗ } contract results in
coordinated selling quantities. The manufacturer’s profit, Π∗∗ , is given by,
Π∗∗ =

4(α − c)2 + 4ρ(α − c)(α + c(−1 + 2δ)) + δρ2 (4(α − c)2 + (c2 + 6cα − 3α2 )δ)
= Πs
16 + 4δρ(4 − 3δ)

(A9)

and the manufacturer’s margin is given by
w1∗∗ − c =

δ ρ [α [4 − 2δ + 4δρ − 3 δ 2 ρ] − c (4 − 2δ + 4δρ − δ2 ρ)]
.
8 + 2 δ (4 − 3 δ) ρ

∗∗ , to be positive, α > c 4−2δ +(4−δ) ρδ .
For the second-period sales, q2n
4−2δ+(4−3 δ) ρδ

(A10)

Therefore, for any

value of δ > 0, w1∗∗ − c > 0.

Proposition 3

The fixed fee and the wholesale prices that the manufacturer charges in equilibrium are given
by:
F ∗∗∗ =
w1∗∗∗ =
w2∗∗∗ =

256(α − c)2 + 16ρ(α − c)G + 4δρ2 H + δ 2 ρ3 J
,
4 (−16 + δ (−16 + 7 δ) ρ)2
αδρ[8 − δ(4 − 8ρ) − 5δ 2 ρ] + c[32 + 24δρ + δ 3 ρ2 − 2δ 2 ρ(5 + 4ρ)]
,
32 + 2δρ(16 − 7δ)
1
δ[α(8 + 3δρ) − c(8 − 5δρ)]
[α + c −
],
2
16 + 16δρ − 7δ 2 ρ

(A11)

where
G = α [4 + δ (28 − 5 δ)] − c [4 − δ (4 + 5 δ)],
H = α2 [32 + δ (43 − 15 δ) ] − 2 c α [32 − 5 δ (9 − δ)] + c2 [32 − δ (69 − 25 δ)],
J = α2 (16 − δ) (4 − δ) + c2 [64 − δ (44 − 19 δ)] − 2 c α [64 − δ (116 − 31 δ)].
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Because the margins
4 (α − c) (2 − δ) + δ ρ[α (8 − 5 δ) − c (8 − δ)]
> 0,
32 + 2 δρ (16 − 7 δ)
1
α (8 + 3 δ ρ) − c (8 − 5 δ ρ)
[α − 3 c − δ
] > 0,
2
16 + δ ρ (16 − 7 δ)

w1∗∗∗ − c = δ ρ
w2∗∗∗ − c =

it is clear that the manufacturer does not sell the firm to the retailer.

Proposition 4

The optimal wholesale prices and franchise fee with commitment are:
¡
¢
αδ 2 ρ + c 4 + 4δρ + δ3 ρ2 − 5δ 2 ρ
∗∗∗∗
w1
=
,
4 + 4δρ − 4δ 2 ρ
αδ + c (2 − δ) (1 + δρ)
w2∗∗∗∗ =
,
2 + 2δρ − 2δ 2 ρ
2Acα + Bc2 + Dα2
F ∗∗∗∗ =
,
8[1 + δρ (1 − δ)]2

(A12)
(A13)
(A14)

where
A = (2 + (2 − δ 2 )ρ + 2δ(2 − 3δ + δ 2 )ρ2 + 2(1 − δ)2 δ 2 ρ3 ,
B = (2 + (2 − 4δ − δ 2 )ρ + 2δ(2 − 3δ + 2δ 2 )ρ2 + (2 − δ 2 )δ 2 ρ3 ,
C = (2 + (2 − 2δ − δ2 )ρ + δ(4 − 7δ + 3δ 2 )ρ2 + (2 − 3δ + δ 2 )δ 2 ρ3 .

The optimal sales quantities are:
∗∗∗∗
q1n
=
∗∗∗∗
q2n
=

α − c (1 − δρ)]
,
2 + 2δρ − 2δ 2 ρ
α (1 − δ) (1 + δρ) − c[1 − δ (1 − ρ)]
.
2 + 2δρ − 2δ 2 ρ

(A15)
(A16)

It is easy to see that the selling quantities are identical to the quantities of a monopolist
renter in Equation (8). It can also be shown that the manufacturer’s profit under this contract,
Π∗∗∗∗ ,
Π∗∗∗∗ =

α2 [1 + (1 − δ) ρ] (1 + δ ρ) + c2 [1 + [1 + δ (−2 + ρ)]ρ] − 2 c α [1 + (1 − δ) ρ (1 + δ ρ)]
4 + 4 (1 − δ) δ ρ
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(A17)
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is identical to the profit of the manufacturer when it rents the good directly to consumers. In
addition, the margins in this case are given by:
w1∗∗∗∗ − c =

δ2 ρ [α − c (1 − δ ρ)]
,
4 + 4 (1 − δ) δ ρ

(A18)

δ [α − c (1 − δ ρ)]
.
2 + 2 δ ρ − 2 δ2 ρ

(A19)

w2∗∗∗∗ − c =

For the first-period quantity to be positive, α > c (1 − δ ρ). With this restriction, it is easy
to see that w1∗∗∗∗ > c and w2∗∗∗∗ > c.
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